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for all practical purposes they would have none under the common law. The rule
of public policy would seem to be, and rightly so, that between innocent third parties
and parents of a minor child causing damage through wilful misconduct, the latter
should bear the burden of responsibility. That the Legislature recognized the inherent
danger in this type of legislation is apparent from the strict limitations included in
the statute, both as to the amount of liability, and the wilful nature of the act. Thus
the wording of the statute gives a strong indication that the Legislature intended it
to be strictly construed so as not to further increase the heavy burden placed upon
parents by its operation. To allow the insurer here to throw up the statute as a
defense would be to deprive the parent of the only protection he now has in such
cases. Such an application of the statute to a standard exclusion clause of insurance
contracts would indeed have far-reaching and serious consequences. Imputation of
wilful misconduct to an insured would prevent his indemnification under state law,19
which would naturally lead to uncertainty and confusion of policyholders concerning
the extent of their protection under insurance contracts now in force. This result is
most certainly not in harmony with legislative intent.
Thus the problem, reduced to its basic components, provides its own answer. The
statute imposes a strictly limited liability on one class of persons for the benefit of
another class, also strictly limited by necessity of the first. The insurer, excluded from
the protected class, should not be allowed to reap the benefits of the statute through
subordination of public policy. Theodore H. Stokes, Jr.
REAL PROPERTY: ESTATES ON CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT-EXTENSION OF THE
JuDicIAL BIAs AGAINST FoiRFEITtmE.-The general economic boom in the United States
accompanying the second World War sent land values skyrocketing to unheard-of
heights with the result that many routine grants of property, of previously little
commercial value, for municipal and charitable uses have become the source of much
strongly contested litigation. The majority of cases seem to indicate that the careful
thought and business-like planning that accompanies the preparation of deeds to
property of great commercial value is often neglected when a grantor, with some
degree of donative intent, transfers property of small worth for civic or philanthropic
purposes.
This leaves for the adjudication of the courts many cases which could have been
avoided by a competent draftsman.
Faust v. Little Rock School District,1 decided in March, 1955, is worthy of note
as representative of such cases. In this case, land of relatively little value was granted
in 1843 to the mayor and alderman of the city of Little Rock in their corporate
capacities. The grantor, an attorney of some renown, in a lengthy and detailed writing,
provided that the grant was:
"... subject also to the restrictions and conditions hereinafter made . . .and for
the special purpose of being appropriated and used by [the city] for the erection thereon
of a city hospital, workhouse or other public building as may to them seem most con-
ductive to the public good and the same shall not be sold or disposed of, nor shall the
title vest in the city except on the conditions aforesaid." 2
' CALIF. INs. CODE § 533 (1935).
- Ark. - , 276 S.W.2d 59 (1955).
2 Id. at -, 276 S.W.2d at 60.
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The habendum of the deed repeated the grantor's terms that the conveyance was:
"... upon the several conditions and for the special purposes herein set forth and
specified and none other whatsoever." 3
The plaintiff appellee school district acquired title by warranty deed from the
city of Little Rock in 1870 and brought this action to quiet title against the heirs of
the original grantor. Since the time of the original grant to the city, the property
had increased in value by nearly $350,000 and the defendant appellants sought to
maintain an alleged right of entry for condition broken in this action.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, quieting title in the school district, affirmed the
decree of the lower court. In an indecisive opinion, it was held that the original
grant to the city did not create an estate on condition subsequent and further that
conditions, if any, had become inoperative by the grantor's heirs remaining silent for
seventy years after the conveyance by the city to the school district.
In this case, then, all of the qualifications put in the deed by the draftsman under
the label of condition had no legal effect and the grantor, for all practical purposes,
would have been as well off had he simply saved his many words and granted to the
city in fee simple absolute.
What, then, in terms of this decision, is required to effectively create an estate
on condition subsequent? Would the answer have been different in 1843 when the
deed in question was drawn?
California courts have continued to recite the deed requirements for the creation
of an estate on condition subsequent that were present in early English law4 and have
continued to verbalize the time-honored rules applicable to interpreting deeds that
require judicial construction, 5 but a strengthening of the judicial bias against con-
ditions, resulting in forfeiture, is to be found in the decisions.
The Arkansas Chief Justice, in the case under note, pointed out that the early
common law did not favor conditions subsequent but said that: "Today's authorities
are more restrictive than the judgments and decrees of a century ago."
The existence of this more restrictive judicial prejudice against forfeiture has had
a pronouncd effect on the requisites necessary to be included in the conveyance of
an estate on condition subsequent. The scope of these changes may be demonstrated
by a review of the California cases in point since 1900.
In 1901, the California Supreme Court, in the case of Papst v. Hamilton,
7
declared a forfeiture for breach of condition subsequent, holding that:
"A deed conveying to grantees . . .upon conditions that the premises should be
used solely for erecting, furnishing, keeping and maintaining thereon an academic or
collegiate school, etc., and for no other purposes whatever, creates a conditional estate
in the grantees .... The language used both in its technical and popular sense ex proprio
vigore imports a condition, or the intent of the grantor to make a conditional estate and
where this is the case a clause of re-entry is unnecessary." 8
The language used by the grantor in this case, held to be sufficient to create an
estate on condition subsequent by the California court 54 years ago is almost identical
to the language of the grantor in the Faust case where the Arkansas court held the
language insufficient to create such an estate in 1955.
Ibid.
' Behlow v. Southern Pac. Ry., 130 Cal. 16, 62 Pac. 295 (1900) ; 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 142 (1949).
' CALIF. CIv. CODE §§ 1069, 1443.
6 See note I supra, 276 S.W.2d at 63.
133 Cal. 631, 66 Pac. 10 (1901).
' Id. at 633, 66 Pac. at 10.
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A California appellate court decision, Martin v. City of Stockton,9 in 1919
followed the Papst case holding that an estate on condition subsequent had been
created where the grant read:
"Providing, however, and this conveyance is made and accepted upon the express
condition, limitation and restriction that said party of the second part and its successors
forever shall use said premises for excavating and as a waterway and drain only and no
other purpose whatsoever."' 0
This decision did not involve a forfeiture, it being an action to gain title by
adverse possession which was defeated, and is, therefore, of questionable weight in
determining what the courts require to limit an estate by way of condition subsequent
so as to impose a forfeiture for breach. This case and the Papst case, however, are
the last California appellate decisions in the official reports that held a condition
subsequent had been created where the intention of the grantor was manifest by
nothing more than the use of the words, "on condition."
The Papst case, decided in 1901, represents the last declaration of a forfeiture
for condition broken where the conveyance did not specifically state that upon breach
of the conditions a forfeiture was to result, or the grantor was to have the right of
re-entry, or the property was to revert.
In Behlow v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company"l the court decided that an
estate on condition subsequent had been created by a deed that contained no words
of condition but provided:
"The conveyance of these lands is made for railroad purposes only and if not so used
then it is to revert to the parties of the first part."12
In Reclamation District No. 55 v. Van Loben Sels,'3 a similar deed provided:
"... for the purpose of reclamation only and if said lands shall cease to be used
for such purposes, the same shall thereon revert to the said party of the first part. ..."4
In neither of the above cases were the words, "on condition," used but the court
held the intention to create a conditional estate sufficiently expressed by the inclusion
of the reverter clause.
Then, in 1926, when the Hasman v. Elk Grove Union High School15 case was
decided, the appellate court exercised the judicial bias against forfeiture to new limits.
The facts were similar to our principal case, the grantee high school having used
the land for a school for 29 years before moving it to a location that would better
serve their needs. The deed to the school under which the plaintiff sought to quiet his
title read:
".... [Tbo have and to hold .. .provided the same shall be used for the purpose of
maintaining thereon a high school, otherwise the above described property shall revert to
and become the property of the party of the first part, his heirs and assigns." 16
In interpreting the grant, the court said:
"Had it been the intention ...that the property should revert upon the discon-
tinuance of its use for high school purposes it would have been so easy to have so stated
in plain and simple language that it must be inferred from the terms actually employed
that such was not his intention." 17
039 Cal.App. 552, 179 Pac. 894 (1919).
'
0 Id. at 555, 179 Pac. at 896.
1130 Cal. 16, 62 Pac. 295 (1900).12Id. at 18, 62 Pac. at 295.
18145 Cal. 181, 78 Pac. 638 (1904).1 Id. at 183, 78 Pac. at 639.
'5 76 Cal.App. 629, 245 Pac. 464 (1926).81d. at 631, 245 Pac. at 465.17Id. at 634, 245 Pac. at 466.
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Putting the deeds in the Papst, Behlow and Reclamation District cases, where the
language was held to create a condition subsequent, alongside the words here inter-
preted, it would seem certain that the conveyance in the Hasman case was definite in
spelling out the grant of an estate on condition subsequent since here, unlike the
Papst case, the grantor included a provision for forfeiture in the event of a breach.
The court, however, distinguished Papst v. Hamilton by saying:
"... the language used in the instrument there considered was so plain and certain
as to require no interpretation."' 8
The court, in quieting title in the grantee, reasoned that the deed did not provide
for a reversion upon the discontinuance of the use as a school but upon failure to so
use it. Black's Law Dictionary' 9 describes the word "failure" as "abandonment,"
"defeat," or "discontinuance" (emphasis added). In terms of this, the court's inter-
pretation amounts to unpredictable hair-splitting. No logical explanation can be
given for such conclusions except that the courts have become more determined to
avert the forfeiture of estates.
The decision in the Hasman case can't be rationalized by thinking of it as an
"outlaw case." Six years later, in 1932, the appellate court decided Booth v. County
of Los Angeles20 where the grant, similar to the one in the Hasman case, read:
"This conveyance is made for the purpose of a road or highway, to revert to said
J. J. Harshman, his heirs and assigns if not so used."
21
The court refused to find that a condition subsequent existed in spite of the
fact that the words were exactly the same as those which the Supreme Court had
found sufficient to create such an estate in 1904 in Behlow v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Company, cited above. The opinion of the court repeated the words of the Hasman
case that:
"Had it been the intention of the grantor herein that the property should revert upon
the discontinuance of its use for road purposes, it would have been so easy to have so
stated in plain and simple language that it must be inferred from the terms actually
employed that such was not the intention of the grantor." 22
When Rosecrans v. Pacific Electric Railroad2 3 was decided in 1943 by the
Supreme Court, sitting in bank, Justice Carter, in a well-reasoned opinion, said of
the Hasman case: "That reasoning is rendered doubtful by the decision of this court
in Romero v. Department of Public Works."'24
As late as 1949, however, the Attorney General cited the Hasman case in address-
ing the District Attorney of Colusa County as to whether an estate on condition
subsequent had been granted by a deed to the Bridgeport School District. 25 The
opinion of the Attorney General concluded that:
"The absence of a reversionary clause in the deed in question prevents the creation
of a condition subsequent. The reasoning of the cases in those instances where no words
of reversion are found is that if the grantor had intended a forfeiture he most certainly
would have indicated said intention by the inclusion in his deed of words of reverter. The




'" 4th Ed. 711 (1951).
20 124 Cal.App. 259, 12 P.2d 72 (1932).
2 Id. at 260, 12 P.2d at 72.
22 Id. at 262, 12 P.2d at 73.
3 21 Cal.2d 602, 134 P.2d 245.
21 Id. at 608, 134 P.2d at 248.
" 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 142 (1949).
26 Id. at 143.
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In 1935, in Gramer v. The City of Sacramento,27 the Supreme Court adopted the
words of the appellate court in the Hasman case to hold that no condition subsequent
had been created by a deed that made certain provisions, using the word, "condition,"
but contained no right of re-entry clause. The court ruled:
"... . the deed contained no words of reverter or forfeiture. It would have been a
simple thing had the grantor contemplated such a possibility for him to have inserted
appropriate language making provision for a forfeiture. ... No condition in a deed
relied on to create a condition subsequent will be so interpreted if the language of the
provision will bear any other reasonable construction ....28
To appreciate the change in attitude reflected by the above excerpts, compare
the words to the opinion of the same court considering the same problem in Victoria
Hospital Association v. All Persons29 in 1915 where the court said:
"It is true that the words 'on condition that' are apt and appropriate words, both in
their technical and popular sense, to create a condition, and it appears to be the
generally accepted doctrine that, as the words 'on condition' are the precise and technical
terms by which an estate on condition is created, such a phrase is sufficient to create
a conditional estate, unless there is something else in the deed indicating the contrary.
"This is the accepted doctrine in this court and such words ex proprio vigore import
such condition in the absence of other language inconsistent therewith." 30
Whereas the content of the two excerpts above is not necessarily contradictory,
when viewing the two opinions together, it is an unmistakable conclusion that the
recognized bias of the courts against forfeiture had gained strength in the 25 years
that separated the opinions.
In the early 1900's, we saw the Supreme Court hold that an estate on condition
subsequent had been created31 and that there should be a forfeiture3 2 where the only
language relied on by the court to manifest the grantor's intention to create such an
estate amounted to the words, "on condition." In other cases, where the grantor had
substituted a declaration of purpose as to the use of the property in place of the
words, "on condition," but had included a reverter clause, we saw the court hold
that an estate on condition subsequent had been granted.3 3 Then after 1926, we saw
a change of tenor in the opinions, accompanied by more restrictive decisions ruling
that such language was insufficient to show the intent of the grantor to create an
estate on condition subsequent.3 4
Upon this authority, the statement, in the decision of the Arkansas Court, that
today's authorities are more restrictive than the judgments and decrees of a century
ago is certainly applicable to the California courts, and this fact should pervade the
thought of every draftsman attempting to limit an estate by way of condition subse-
quent.
The old rules, still being cited by the courts, that:
".. .While no precise form of words is necessary to create a condition subsequent,
still it must be created by express terms or clear implication,"3 5 and,
27 2 CaL2d 432, 41 P.2d 543 (1935).
28 Id. at 439, 41 P.2d at 546.
"169 Cal. 455, 147 Pac. 124 (1915).
oId. at 460, 147 Pac. at 126.
"Martin v. City of Stockton, 39 Cal.App. 552, 179 Pac. 894 (1919).
"Papst v. Hamilton, 133 Cal. 631, 66 Pac. 10 (1901).
Reclamation Dist. v. Van Loben Sels, 145 Cal. 181, 78 Pac. 638 (1904) ; Behlow v. Southern
Pac. Ry., 130 Cal. 16, 62 Pac. 295 (1900).
" Gramer v. Sacramento, 2 Cal.2d 432, 41 P.2d 543 (1935) ; Booth v. County of Los Angeles,
124 CaLApp. 259, 12 P.2d 72 (1932) ; Hasman v. Elk Grove Union High School, 76 CalApp. 629,
245 Pac. 464 (1926).
" Hawlew v. Kafitz, 148 CaL 393, 83 Pac. 248 (1905).
Nov., 1955] NOTES
